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Abstract 
The aims of this study were to identify predictors regarding people’s willingness to be 
vaccinated against influenza and to determine how to improve the inoculation rate using our 
original large-scale survey in the USA in 2005. The main results are (a) a model of bounded 
rationality explains vaccination behavior fairly well, i.e., people evaluate the costs and benefits 
of vaccination by applying risk aversion and time preference, while the ‘status quo bias’ of 
those who received vaccinations in the past affect their decision to be vaccinated in the future, 
(b) it is recommended to increase people’s knowledge regarding flu vaccination, but not 
regarding influenza illness, (c) reducing the vaccination fee may be ineffective in raising the 
rate of vaccination. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Influenza vaccination has been shown to be cost effective in reducing morbidity and 
mortality in the older adult population, and in reducing morbidity, work absenteeism, and use 
of healthcare resources among the healthy working adult population (Bridges et al., 2000; Lee 
et al., 2002; Nichol et al., 2003). Vaccine prevents influenza in approximately 70%−90% of 
healthy adults under the age of 65 years and in 58% among persons over 60 years of age 
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(Bridges et al., 2000; Demicheli et al., 2000). Although influenza vaccination levels increased 
substantially during the 1990s, further improvements in vaccination coverage levels are needed. 
For example, in 2004, the estimated vaccination coverage among adults with high-risk 
conditions aged 18−49 years and 50−64 years was 26% and 46%, respectively, substantially 
lower than the Healthy People 2000 and Healthy People 2010 objectives of 60% (CDC, 2006).  
 Theoretically, the socially optimal rate of inoculation should be substantially higher 
than an individual’s optimal rate because catching an infectious disease has great external 
implications on the society. Thus, raising willingness to be inoculated is socially desirable, 
even if it does not conform to an individual’s rational decision. In this paper, we investigate 
whether or not propagation of information regarding influenza and its vaccine will raise 
willingness to undergo inoculation.1 This is not known a priori; it could be that more 
information will diminish people’s willingness because they may unreasonably fear influenza 
and/or irrationally overestimate the effectiveness of flu inoculation. Of course the opposite 
might be the case, that increased information will substantially promote inoculation. This paper 
tries to identify what kind of information might be effective in raising the inoculation rate. In 
this sense, our study follows a behavioral economic approach and focuses on the bounded 
rationality of individuals. In addition to the effect of knowledge, we expected to find other 
behavioral factors, such as status quo bias and overconfidence effect, to affect the inoculation 
decision. Status quo bias refers to the situation in which people tend not to change an 
established behavior unless the incentive to change is compelling (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 
1988). The overconfidence effect is the tendency of people to underestimate “real” objective 
risks (Griffin and Varey, 1996).  
 To be useful in policy planning, analyses should consider comprehensive factors as 
well as irrational aspects of human beings. First, bounded rationality means that people are 
fairly rational and can be expected to make a decision on inoculation based on its benefits and 
costs. In particular, it is hypothesized that beliefs regarding the probability of contracting the 
flu, the severity of the illness, and the effectiveness and side effects of the vaccine as well as 
preferences involving time and risks play important roles in assessing the costs and benefits of 
influenza inoculation. In addition, characteristics such as gender and age may explain the 
willingness to be vaccinated. The present study analyzes comprehensive factors regarding 
people’s willingness to be vaccinated against the flu, an approach that is possible because of 
our original large survey conducted across the USA.  
 It is natural to suppose that people agree to be vaccinated based on perceived costs and 
benefits which, in turn, depend on subjective beliefs regarding influenza and vaccination. 
Indeed, the Health Belief Model (HBM) explains and predicts preventive health behavior in 
terms of belief patterns that focus on the relationship of health behaviors and utilization of 
health services (Rosenstock et al., 1988). According to the HBM, acceptance of an influenza 
vaccination depends on the following predictors: perception of susceptibility to influenza, 
                                                 
1 In an empirical study conducted in the USA, Wu (2003) found that people with more education, 
higher incomes, and better insurance coverage are more likely to get flu shots, as well as other types of 
preventive medical treatments.  
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beliefs about the severity of influenza, perceived benefits of the vaccine in preventing 
influenza, perceived barriers to accepting a vaccine, influence by cues (such as media 
information or physician recommendation) to action, and degree of motivation for other health 
behaviors (Blue and Valley, 2002). Indeed, cited reasons for not receiving an influenza 
vaccination were similar across studies with reference to perceived barriers, i.e., concern about 
side effects or vaccine safety, lack of effectiveness of the vaccine in preventing illness, and 
lack of awareness (Chapman and Coups, 1999a; Chen J.Y. et al. 2007). The HBM has been 
used to explore a variety of health behaviors, including vaccination (Blue and Valley, 2002; 
Chen J.Y. et al., 2007; Lau et al., 2008; Shahrabani et al., 2009). Our study, likewise, is 
partially based on the HBM.  
 The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we explain our model and methods, 
Section 3 explains our survey, and Section 4 is devoted to the results. Section 5 summarizes 
and concludes the study.  
 
2. The model 
 
2.1. Vaccination behavior model 
 
2.1.1. The basic model 
 As traditional economics assumes, we assume that people make a decision about being 
vaccinated based on perceived costs and benefits which, in turn, are based on beliefs regarding 
the probability of infection, the severity of the illness, the effectiveness of the vaccine, and the 
side effects of the vaccine, as the HBM assumes. We also assume that the decision depends on 
a time discount rate because the benefits of vaccination will be realized in the future while its 
costs are paid in the present.2 Thus, it is expected that people with a higher discount rate will 
be less likely to receive the vaccination. High risk aversion may affect the decision to be 
vaccinated in two opposing ways: while some will take the vaccine because they fear the 
consequences of influenza illness, others may worry about its side effects and not be 
vaccinated. Thus, the effect of degree of risk aversion is, a priori, ambiguous. 
 Although we agree that traditional economics explains inoculating behavior fairy well, 
we also assume that rationality is bounded. Thus, we suppose that the decision to be vaccinated 
is biased by several factors. Previous vaccination and illness experiences affect the decision, as 
well as overconfidence and level of education. Socio-demographic background, economic 
status, and health status are known to impact an individual’s decision to be vaccinated 
(Shahrabani and Benzion, 2006; Chen Y. et al., 2007). Thus, we include respondents’ 
characteristics in our estimation. 
 Our model is that willingness of inoculation (WTINJ) depends on (a) beliefs regarding 
costs and benefits of vaccination, (b) time discounting, risk aversion, and overconfidence 
                                                 
2 See Shahrabani et al. (2008). Chapman and Coups (1999b) provide some evidence that individuals’ 
time preference patterns can explain preventive health behavior; in particular, monetary time 
preferences predict whether people took flu shots. 
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(perceived lower self-risk), (c) past experience with flu shots, preventive health, and influenza 
illness, and (d) education level and socio-demographic attributes. 
 
2.1.2 The dependent variable 
  The dependent variable, WTINJ, is the willingness to receive a flu shot within twelve 
months, a categorical variable from 1 = certainly to 5 = certainly not. 
 
2.1.3. The independent variables 
 Perceived benefits and costs of vaccination depend on perceptions of the (a) probability 
of infection (PROB), (b) seriousness of the illness (ILL), (c) degree to which family and friends 
would be bothered or inconvenienced in case the respondent contracts influenza (BOTHER), 
(d) effectiveness of vaccination (EFFECT), (e) side effects of the flu shot (SIDE), and (f) 
financial cost of the flu shot (FEE). An increase in items (a)-(d) results in an increase in 
benefits of the vaccination; an increase in items (e) and/or (f) results in an increase in costs. 
 The degree of time preference (DTP) is measured by whether or not a person is willing 
to postpone pleasure. A person with a higher DTP (i.e., smaller time discount rate) is more 
future oriented. A sample question for measuring risk aversion (RA) is “how high does the 
probability of rain have to be for you to take an umbrella?” RA is a percent, defined as 100 less 
the answer to the question.3 Overconfidence (OVER) is evaluated by the answer to the question 
“does the statement ‘I will never be robbed’ hold true to you?” and is measured on a scale from 
1 to 5.  
 Regarding past experience, we examine: (a) whether respondents ever received a flu 
shot (EXINJ), (b) whether they were infected by influenza during the last two years (EXILL), 
(c) if they had periodic blood tests (TESTP), and (d) if they had blood tests because of a 
suspected illness (TESTS)4. Variable (a) is especially interesting because we expect that 
individuals have status quo bias, i.e., those who previously received the flu vaccination will 
continue to receive an annual vaccination. We expect that variables (a), (c), and (d) will have 
positive effects on WTINJ in the estimation of Eq. (1) with whole samples.  
 We also speculate that status quo bias makes people automatically choose to accept the 
vaccine without examining it fully so that, for such respondents, the explanatory power of 
perceived benefits and costs of vaccination will be lower. To examine this hypothesis, we 
estimate Eq. (1) not only for whole samples but also for samples divided according to whether 
or not they previously received the vaccination.  
 Regarding characteristics, we examine education level (EDUC), gender (MALE), 
marital status (MARRY), anxiety regarding health (HEALTH), and age (AGE). Special attention 
is paid to the level of education because it may represent acquired knowledge and the ability to 
                                                 
3 The variable may also be interpreted as an individual’s probability for action and precautionary 
motivation. 
4 Evidence indicates that preventive behaviors may be highly correlated with one another (Fukunaga et 
al., 1997). 
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digest information, which may impact WTINJ. We include age because flu is especially 
dangerous to elderly people. In addition to the elderly, unhealthy people are especially 
vulnerable to flu, thus we include HEALTH, which represents the respondent’s degree of 
anxiety about his/her own health. We expect that those with higher anxiety levels will be more 
motivated to take the vaccine. 
  
2.1.4. Equation for the model 
 The equation for the model that examines factors affecting the willingness to be 
vaccinated is as follows: 
 
 
uAGEHEALTHMARRYMALEEDUCTESTS
TESTPEXINJEXILLOVERRADTPFEE
SIDEEFFECTBOTHERILLPROBWTINJ
+++++++
+++++++
+++++=
543214
3213216
54321
εεεεεδ
δδδγγγβ
βββββα
  (1)  
 
The list of variables, their definitions, and a short description of the survey question for each 
are presented in Table 15. The constant term is indicated by α  and disturbance is marked by u. 
 
2.2. How the subjective variables are influenced by exogenous variables 
 
 The variables representing costs and benefits in Eq. (1) are subjective variables that 
may be affected by exogenous variables such as a respondent’s characteristics. Therefore, if 
we want to draw policy implications from estimations of Eq. (1) and accurately evaluate the 
effect of exogenous variables on WTINJ, we need to weigh their indirect effect via the 
subjective variables. We used the equation below to analyze the effect of exogenous factors on 
subjective variables that, in turn, affect the willingness to be vaccinated. 
  
 
vAGEMARRYMALE
HEALTHOVEREDUCEXILLSBJVAR
++++
++++=
765
43210
ϕϕϕ
ϕϕϕϕϕ      (2)  
 
 Here, SBJVAR stands for PROB, ILL, BOTHER, EFFECT, SIDE, and FEE.6 The 
constant term is indicated by 0ϕ  and disturbance is indicated by v.7 In cases when PROB is the 
dependent variable, we suppose that anxiety about one’s own health (HEALTH) has a positive 
effect on PROB, and that overconfidence (OVER) has a negative effect. We also suppose that 
MALE has a negative effect because males are more overconfident than females (Barber and 
Odean, 2001), a tendency that might not be fully grasped by OVER. We further suppose that 
                                                 
5 Expected signs for the coefficients of the factors are shown in Table 4. The signs indicate whether a 
factor is expected to positively or negatively affect the willingness to be vaccinated 
6 However, FEE turns out to be insignificant in the estimation of Eq. (1). 
7 Expected signs for the factors are shown in Table 5. 
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AGE has a positive effect on PROB because elderly people tend to be less healthy, a tendency 
that might not be fully represented by HEALTH. 
 
3. Our survey and data 
 
 The COE (Center of Excellence) project of Osaka University in Japan, which was 
funded by the Japanese government, conducted a large survey in the USA in 2005. 8 We 
extracted a sample of 12,338 subjects from the study based on region, gender, race, and age, 
balanced according to census division demographics. Questionnaires were sent to the subjects 
in January and 4979 responses (40%) were received. The number of respondents from each 
region is shown in Fig. 1. The survey questionnaire comprised 102 questions including eleven 
on attitude toward influenza and flu vaccination. 
 The number of respondents in each category (gender, age, received flu shot in past, and 
had been ill with influenza) is given in Table 2. Women comprised about 55% of the 
respondents, over 60 years represented 23%, and those who received a flu shot in the past 
constituted 59%. The percentage of those who had been vaccinated in the past was much 
higher (78%) among subjects over 60 years than among subjects 60 years and under (53%).  
 Table 3 summarizes the mean values of the variables used in this paper, as reported on 
the returned questionnaires. The intention to be vaccinated is higher for the group that was 
vaccinated in the past (3.40 for individuals 60 years and younger and 4.10 for individuals over 
60 years) than for the group that was never vaccinated (1.68 for 60 years and younger and 1.78 
for over 60). Mean values for perceived effectiveness of vaccination and degree of anxiety 
about health are higher for the group that received the vaccine in the past than for those who 
never received it, while the mean value for estimated side effects of the flu shot is higher for 
the second group. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Results of the decision model 
 
 Table 4 reports the results for Eq. (1) estimated by the ordered probit method. For the 
entire sample, most of the variables relating to costs and benefits of vaccination, including 
perceived probability of infection (PROB), seriousness of illness (ILL), degree of bother to 
family and friends in case of illness (BOTHER), effectiveness of vaccination (EFFECT), and 
expected side effects of flu shot (SIDE), are highly significant and have the expected positive 
influence on the willingness to receive the flu shot (WTINJ). The only exception is the fee 
(FEE), for which the influence was negative but the p value was 0.33. Therefore, we conclude 
that models such as the HBM, in which costs and benefits play an important role, are 
overwhelmingly supported.  
                                                 
8 The questionnaire can be seen at http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/coe/project/survey-0502e.pdf. 
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 Risk aversion (RA) positively affects the decision to be vaccinated, implying that the 
impact of perceived effectiveness of vaccination dominates the impact of its estimated side 
effects. As expected, the degree of time preference (DTP) positively affects the decision to be 
vaccinated, meaning that future-oriented people have greater intentions to take the flu shot. 
These results suggest that a traditional economic approach assuming rational agents well 
explains influenza vaccination behavior. 
 Regarding characteristics of the respondents, all age dummies are significantly positive, 
with elderly people more willing to undergo vaccination, as expected. The degree of anxiety 
about one’s health (HEALTH) is significantly positive, indicating that those with greater 
anxiety have greater intentions to be vaccinated. Married people are more likely to get 
vaccinated. Gender and education were not significant. 
 
4.2. Examination of status quo bias 
 
 Among the variables concerning experience, previous flu illness (EXILL) was not 
significant, which is an unexpected result. However, past flu vaccination (EXINJ) had a 
significantly positive effect on WTINJ, clearly confirming the status quo bias. In addition, 
having periodic blood tests (TESTP) was significantly positive, as was having had blood tests 
when disease was suspected (TESTS), even though the significance was 20%. Status quo bias 
is also seen in Table 3: those who were vaccinated in the past are much more willing to be 
vaccinated than the average while those who were never vaccinated are much less willing than 
the average. 
 We now examine if belief variables are less significant for those who were vaccinated 
in the past than for those who were never vaccinated, a second hypothesis of the status quo 
bias. In this estimation, the experience variables (EXINJ, EXILL, TESTP, and TESTS), were 
deleted from Eq. (1). Results are given in columns 6-9 of Table 4 (headed ‘Vaccinated in past’ 
and ‘Never vaccinated’). Focusing on the belief variables, PROB, BOTHER, and others 
became insignificant among those who had been vaccinated in the past but remained 
significant among those who were never vaccinated. So did the degree of time preference 
(DTP), which evaluates costs paid now versus benefits obtained in the future. These results 
support our hypothesis.  
 In contrast, age dummies are more significant for those who were vaccinated in the past 
than for those who were never vaccinated. Although this result is not inconsistent with our 
hypothesis regarding status quo bias since age is not ‘a perceived variable’, it is intriguing to 
explore the reason behind it. One possible explanation is that this result does not reflect the 
influence of having been vaccinated (EXINJ) but, rather, the causality of age on acceptance of 
the vaccination in the past. To examine this hypothesis, we regressed EXINJ over the 
independent variables of Eq. (1).9 Results are shown in columns 10 and 11 of Table 4. (headed 
‘Dependent value is EXINJ’). While a couple of belief variables loose their explanatory power, 
                                                 
9 EXINJ, of course, is deleted from the explanatory variables. 
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age dummies have significant power to explain inoculation behavior in the past, supporting our 
interpretation.  
 In summary, results of the decision model confirm most of our hypotheses. Specifically, 
both traditional and behavioral economic approaches are valid for explaining inoculation 
behavior. However, a direct effect of education level on the willingness to receive vaccination 
was not found. Thus, we need to examine how education level indirectly affects willingness 
via beliefs. This was done using Eq. (2) and is discussed in the next section. 
 
4.3. Results of the subjective variable model 
 
 Results of the subjective variable model specified in Eq. (2) are summarized in Table 5. 
All perception variables, except PROB, are ordered categories. Thus, Eq. (2) was estimated by 
ordered probit except for PROB, which was estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). All 
the variables are highly significant, especially EXILL whose large positive coefficient suggests 
representative bias. Health anxiety (HEALTH) also has a positive effect. On the other hand, 
overconfidence mitigates the subjective probability of infection. Women have a higher PROB 
value than men; married individuals have a higher PROB value than unmarried. A higher age 
results in a higher PROB, while higher education results in a lower PROB.  
 As to the estimations for belief variables, two comments are in order. 
 First, overconfidence does not directly affect vaccination behavior, as shown in Table 4, 
but indirectly decreases WTINJ via PROB, as shown in Table 5. This fact would have been 
overlooked if we did not estimate Eq. (2). Actually, consistent with our intuition, 
overconfidence significantly decreases ILL, FEE, and SIDE, and significantly increases 
EFFECT. In Table 5, the dummy variable representing gender (MALE) is negative, as is 
overconfidence, in the estimation of PROB, ILL, FEE, and SIDE, suggesting that males are 
more overconfident than females. This suggestion has been widely accepted; Barber and 
Odean (2001) used the male dummy as a proxy of overconfidence.  
 Second, the finding that AGE negatively affects PROB is somewhat unexpected but 
probably because older people tend to accept more vaccines and think their probability of 
contracting influenza is lower. Effects of AGE on other dependent variables were consistent 
with our expectations. 
 
4.4. How to raise inoculation rate? 
  
 Our final goal was to find a means of raising the inoculation rate. Although a natural 
suggestion might be to lower the inoculation fee, this seems useless in the USA because the 
coefficient of FEE is insignificant (Table 4).10 Thus, we examined a second possibility, 
increasing public knowledge of the risks of influenza and the usefulness of the vaccine.  
 The coefficient of education (EDUC) is significantly negative in the estimation of 
PROB (Table 5). In Eq. (1), PROB has a positive effect on the willingness to receive 
                                                 
10 However, for those who took vaccination, it is significant at the 10% level. 
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vaccination but EDUC is not significant, implying that higher education lowers WTINJ. 
Assuming that people with a higher education are better able to acquire and process 
information, this result suggests that conveying more information to people may lower the 
vaccination rate. 
 To examine the effect of information on WTINJ, however, we need to measure its 
effects not only on PROB but also on the other belief variables. Results show that the 
coefficients of EDUC are negative in the estimation of PROB, ILL, and SIDE, but positive for 
FEE and EFFECT. To measure the effect of EDUC on WTINJ through these belief variables, 
we multiplied the marginal effects (ME) of EDUC in Table 5 by the ME of these variables in 
Eq. (1), shown in Table 4. Since all equations except for PROB are estimated by ordered probit, 
we calculated their effects as follows. First, the expectation of the dependent variable Y (which 
takes the value 1, 2, …, J) is defined as: 
 
  ∑
=
≡
J
jjEY
1j
)(P          (3) 
 
where P(j) stands for the probability that Y takes on the value of j. The ME of an exogenous 
variable (x) on the expected value is defined as: 
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j
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x
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Therefore, for example, the ME of SIDE, is calculated as follows: 
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  The calculated values are shown in the bottom row of Table 5. They are negative for 
PROB and ILL, while positive for EFFECT and SIDE.12 Considering that PROB, ILL, and 
BOTHER are subjective perceptions regarding the illness, while FEE, EFFECT, and SIDE are 
subjective perceptions regarding the vaccine, these results may suggest that increased 
education on the illness will lead to a decrease in willingness to be vaccinated, while increased 
education on the vaccine will raise this willingness.  
 To confirm this hypothesis, we calculated the sum of indirect effects of EDUC on 
WTINJ through the perception variables. The sum of the indirect effects of EDUC through 
perception variables concerning the illness (PROB, ILL, and BOTHER) is -0.0091, while the 
sum concerning the vaccine (EFFECT, FEE, and SIDE) is 0.0143, resulting in a cumulative 
                                                 
11 For the variable PROB, the value of the estimated coefficient itself is the marginal value.  
12 Those for BOTHER and FEE are insignificant. 
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positive effect of 0.0052.13 These results may be interpreted thusly: (a) people, on average, 
believe influenza to be more serious than it really is and (b) they do not trust the vaccination to 
the extent it deserves.  
 Indeed, as shown in Table 5, having had influenza (EXILL) lowers the subjective 
severity of the disease (ILL), suggesting that the flu was milder than expected. To see the effect 
of having been vaccinated, we added a cross term of EXINJ and EXILL to Eq. (2) and 
estimated them (results not shown). The coefficient of the cross term is significantly positive 
for EFFECT, suggesting that EXINJ raises EFFECT in people that experienced the flu.14  
 These results suggest that dissemination of information on the vaccine may promote 
inoculation because people currently undervalue the effectiveness of vaccination. In contrast, 
dissemination of information on the illness may decrease vaccination because people believe 
influenza is more serious than it really is.  
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
 The current study identified behaviors and beliefs regarding willingness to get a flu 
shot. It shows that individuals who were more willing to be vaccinated had stronger beliefs (a) 
in the probability of contracting the disease, (b) that influenza is serious, (c) that the vaccine is 
effective, and (d) that side effects of the vaccine are minor. These results are compatible with 
the HBM approach, suggesting that people rationally assess costs and benefits before deciding 
to be vaccinated.15  
 The current study is unique in that it uses survey questions to grasp preference factors 
such as attitude towards risk and time preference. We found that individuals who are more 
future oriented (i.e., have a lower discount rate) put greater emphasis on future benefits of 
vaccination and lesser emphasis on immediate costs. Therefore, they are more willing to be 
vaccinated. We also found that individuals with greater risk aversion are more willing to be 
vaccinated, suggesting that the fear of influenza dominates the fear of side effects of the 
vaccine. Finding that costs and benefits as well as preferences have strong explanatory power 
indicates that traditional economics is a powerful vehicle for understanding vaccination 
behavior. 
                                                 
13 For a robustness check, we also calculated the effects (a) using the coefficients of Eq. (1) instead of 
ME, (b) using OLS estimates instead of estimates by ordered probit, and (c) aggregating only the 
statistically significant paths instead of all paths. In all cases, results were similar. 
14 Following the HBM approach, Blue and Valley (2002) and Nexoe et al. (1999) found that individuals 
who had been vaccinated believed more strongly that influenza is a serious illness and that vaccination 
provides health benefits than those who had not been vaccinated. Our results are consistent with their 
findings. 
15 The high significance of ILL is consistent with the results of Blank et al. (2008). In their study, the 
level of influenza vaccination in five European countries was analyzed. Perception of the flu as a 
serious illness was determined to be one of the principal reasons for being vaccinated. 
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 Nonetheless, this paper argues that traditional economics is not sufficient to fully 
understand vaccination behavior. We speculated that rationality is bounded and examined 
whether overconfidence and past experience affect the behavior. We found that overconfidence 
does not directly affect willingness to be vaccinated, but indirectly affects it through subjective 
variables such as the probability of getting influenza, assessment of its severity, effectiveness 
of the vaccination, and assessment of side effects of the vaccination.  
 We confirmed status quo bias in that previously vaccinated individuals were more 
willing to take the vaccine. Dividing the respondents into two groups according to whether or 
not they had been vaccinated in the past, we confirmed our second hypothesis of status quo 
bias that people who had been vaccinated in the past automatically chose to be vaccinated 
again without careful examination. The subjective probability of contracting influenza (PROB) 
and the degree that the family would be bothered (BOTHER) became insignificant in the 
regression using those who had previously been vaccinated, suggesting our hypothesis is 
accurate.  
 Because influenza has large externalities on society, the optimal vaccination rate of 
society is probably higher than the optimal rate of individuals. Thus, our final goal was to find 
a way to raise the rate based on our results. While policy instruments may include reduction of 
the vaccination fee and dissemination of information regarding influenza and vaccination, our 
results suggest that reducing the fee will not significantly raise the vaccination rate.  
 Then, how about disseminating information? If rationality is bounded, and usually it is, 
advertisement strongly influences behavior. A problem is how to grasp the magnitude of 
information. The variable EDUC may be a good proxy because acquisition and digestion of 
information are easier for those with a higher education.16 Although schooling did not directly 
affect willingness to be vaccinated in Eq. (1), it affected willingness indirectly through 
subjective variables such as PROB, EFFECT, and SIDE in Eq. (2). Closer inspection reveals 
that dissemination of information on the illness does not raise the vaccination rate, but 
information on the vaccination does. 
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Table 1 
Variables and their linkage to the questionnaire. 
  
Variable Definition Question 
no. 
Question Range of answers Value entered into 
formula 
WTINJ Willingness to get flu shot 48 Do you intend to receive the flu shot in the next 12 months? 1 = yes, certainly; 5 = no, certainly 
not 
6 less response 
PROB Subjective probability of illness 50 Estimate your chance to be infected by flu during the next 12 
months. 
0-100% Reported value 
ILL Severity of illness 44 How serious a disease do you think the flu is? 1 = extremely serious; 6 = little 
influence 
7 less response 
BOTHER Bother to family when ill 47 When infected, to what extent do you bother your family and 
friends? 
1 = extremely; 4 = hardly 5 less response 
EFFECT Effectiveness of vaccination 49 How effective do you think the flu shot is? 1 = perfectly; 5 = never effective 6 less response 
SIDE Side effects of vaccine  46 How serious do you think the side effects caused by a flu shot 
are? 
1 = extremely serious; 7 = not 
serious 
8 less response 
FEE Cost of flu shot 45 How much do you think a flu shot costs? 1 = free; 6 = above $50 Reported value 
DTP Time preference 2.5 I want to postpone joys for later. 1 = particularly true; 5 = not true 
at all 
6 less response 
RA Risk aversion; threshold for 
action 
21 How high does the probability of rain have to be in order for you 
to take an umbrella? 
0-100% 100 less response 
OVER Overconfidence 2.6 I will never be robbed. 1 = particularly true; 5 = not true 
at all 
6 less response 
EXINJ Ever received a flu shot 41 Have you ever received a flu shot? no = 0; yes = 1 Reported value 
EXILL Infected during previous 2 years 43 Have you been infected by the flu during the last two years? no = 0; yes = 1 Reported value 
TESTP Periodic blood test  51.1 Did you undergo a blood test in the last 12 months as part of a 
periodic test? 
no = 0; yes = 1 Reported value 
TESTS Blood test because of suspected 
illness  
51.2 Did you undergo a blood test in the last 12 months because of 
suspected disease? 
no = 0; yes = 1 Reported value 
EDUC Education level 58.1 The highest level of education completed? 1 = grade school; 9 = doctoral 
degree 
Reported value 
MALE Gender 54  male = 1; female = 0 Reported value 
MARRY Marital status 55  married = 1; other =0 Reported value 
HEALTH Anxious about health 2.12 I have anxieties about my health. 1 = particularly true; 5 = not true 
at all 
6 less response 
AGE Age 57.1 Your birth year? 20-90 2005 less response 
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Table 2 
Number of respondents in each category (total n = 4979). 
  
  Men Women Age≤60 Age>60 Vaccinated in past Infected by flu during 
last two years 
          Never Yes No Yes 
Total 2231 2748 3506 1159 2039 2940 4004 975 
Men  1541 498 920 1311 1809 422 
Women  1965 661 1119 1629 2195 553 
Age≤60  1646 1860 2704 802 
Age>60  251 908 1047 112 
Never received flu 
shot 
 1604 435 
Received flu shot  2400 540 
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Table 3 
Mean values of the variables (standard errors in parentheses) amongst those who had been 
vaccinated in the past and those who had never been vaccinated, by age. 
 
Vaccinated in past Never vaccinated Variable Scale Mean 
 Age≤60  Age >60 Age≤60 Age>60 
WTINJ 1-5 2.83 
(0.02) 
3.40 
(0.03) 
4.10
(0.04)
1.68
(0.02)
1.78
(0.06)
PROB 0-100 26.01 
(0.35) 
28.99 
(0.58) 
19.20
(0.73)
26.82
(0.61)
23.10
(1.58)
ILL 1-6 4.22 
(0.02) 
4.35 
(0.03) 
4.81
(0.04)
3.81
(0.03)
4.09
(0.09)
BOTHER 1-4 1.68 
(0.01) 
1.73 
(0.01) 
1.53
(0.02)
1.73
(0.02)
1.57
(0.04)
EFFECT 1-5 3.00 
(0.01) 
3.11 
(0.01) 
3.27
(0.02)
2.77
(0.01)
2.69
(0.05)
SIDE 1-7 3.15 
(0.02) 
2.97 
(0.03) 
2.90
(0.05)
3.39
(0.03)
3.80
(0.11)
FEE 1-6 (US$0-50) 3.38 
(0.02) 
3.50 
(0.03) 
3.23
(0.04)
3.42
(0.03)
3.16
(0.09)
DTP 1-5 3.18 
(0.02) 
3.16 
(0.03) 
3.28
(0.04)
3.17
(0.03)
3.17
(0.09)
RA 0-100 40.66 
(0.42) 
39.63 
(0.67) 
43.67
(0.94)
39.73
(0.77)
39.69
(1.89)
OVER 1-5 2.60 
(0.01) 
2.56 
(0.02) 
2.61
(0.04)
2.61
(0.02)
2.54
(0.07)
EXILL 0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
0.19 
(0.00) 
0.22 
(0.01) 
0.09
(0.01)
0.23
(0.01)
0.11
(0.02)
TESTP 0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
0.59 
(0.00) 
0.61 
(0.01) 
0.83
(0.01)
0.45
(0.01)
0.57
 (0.03)
TESTS 0 (no) 
1 (yes) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.04
(0.00)
0.03
(0.00)
0.03
(0.01)
EDUC 1-9 4.80 
(0.02) 
5.02 
(0.04) 
4.62
(0.06)
4.75
(0.04)
4.46
(0.11)
MALE 0 (female) 
1 (male) 
  
MARRY 0 (unmarried) 
1 (married) 
0.42 
(0.01) 
0.35 
(0.01) 
0.39
(0.02)
0.43
(0.01)
0.39
(0.02)
HEALTH 1-5 2.94 
(0.01) 
3.04 
(0.02) 
3.12
(0.04)
2.78
(0.03)
2.70
(0.08)
AGE 20-90 47.61 
(0.25) 
42.25 
(0.27) 
71.56
(0.26)
37.97
(0.28)
68.74
(0.41)
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Table 4 
 Results of decision model Eq. (1), by ordered probit. 
 
 Dependent value is WTINJ 
  Whole sample   Vaccinated in past Never vaccinated
Dependent value is 
EXINJ* 
 Expected
sign 
Estimate P value Marginal
effect
Estimate P value Estimate P value Estimate P value
PROB + 0.0029  0.0000  0.0035 0.0014 0.1820 0.0071 0.0000 0.0024  0.0080 
ILL  + 0.1685  0.0000  0.2042 0.2046 0.0000 0.1017 0.0000 0.1692  0.0000 
BOTHER + 0.1072  0.0000  0.1299 0.0458 0.1370 0.2239 0.0000 -0.0373  0.1870 
EFFECT + 0.4695  0.0000  0.5687 0.5299 0.0000 0.3601 0.0000 0.3473  0.0000 
SIDE - -0.1450  0.0000  -0.1756 -0.1455 0.0000 -0.1142 0.0000 -0.1461  0.0000 
FEE - -0.0134  0.3300  -0.0163 -0.0286 0.1100 -0.0015 0.9440 -0.0007  0.9640 
DTP + 0.0287  0.0830  0.0348 0.0189 0.3670 0.0633 0.0210 0.0009  0.9640 
RA ? 0.0035  0.0000  0.0043 0.0022 0.0100 0.0062 0.0000 0.0011  0.1810 
OVER - -0.0019  0.9080  -0.0023 -0.0121 0.5620 0.0125 0.6510 -0.0017  0.9300 
EXINJ + 1.3024  0.0000  1.4861  
EXILL + 0.0296  0.5450  0.0359  
TESTP + 0.2582  0.0000  0.3108  
TESTS + 0.1192  0.2050  0.1455  
EDUC ? -0.0034  0.7410  -0.0042 0.0067 0.6100 -0.0126 0.4670 0.0449  0.0000 
MALE - 0.0464  0.2190  0.0562 0.0403 0.4010 0.0213 0.7300 0.0296  0.5090 
MARRY ? 0.0114  0.8140  0.0138 -0.1375 0.0360 0.1350 0.0570 -0.2963  0.0000 
HEALTH + 0.0702  0.0000  0.0850 0.0813 0.0000 0.0605 0.0210 0.1099  0.0000 
AGE40 + 0.1312  0.0130  0.1598 0.2234 0.0020 0.0821 0.3000 0.0888  0.1430 
AGE50 + 0.2914  0.0000  0.3564 0.4496 0.0000 0.1138 0.2090 0.4109  0.0000 
AGE60 + 0.5343  0.0000  0.6530 0.6672 0.0000 0.3329 0.0010 0.7557  0.0000 
Constant ?  -1.8001  0.0000 
  S.E.   S.E. S.E.  
μ1  2.4186  2.7137  1.3197 0.1996 2.1704 0.2328   
μ2  3.5376  3.8410  2.2364 0.2012 3.5182 0.2405   
μ3  3.9190  4.2257  2.5596 0.2022 4.2164 0.2496   
μ4   4.5474  4.8599  3.2279 0.2047 4.7455 0.2659   
Pseudo  0.5339   0.2825 0.1674 0.1861   
No. of observations 3809  2362 1534 3908  
 
Note: μ indicates boundary values of categories for which standard errors (S.E.) are given instead of p values. 
 
* In these columns, results of Eq. (1) exclude EXINJ, EXILL, TESTP, and TESTS. 
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Table 5 
How subjective variables are determined, results of Eq. (2). 
 
 Dependent variable 
  PROB ILL BOTHER FEE EFFECT SIDE 
Variable Sign Coeff P value Sign Coeff P value Sign Coeff P value Sign Coeff P value Sign Coeff P value Sign Coeff P value 
Constant ? 34.072 0.000    
OVER - -1.289 0.000 - -0.048 0.001 - 0.014 0.338 - -0.04 0.003 + 0.044 0.002 - -0.04 0.007 
EXILL + 18.7 0.000 ? -0.175 0.000 ? 0.041 0.348 ? 0.005 0.909 ? -0.227 0.000 ? 0.098 0014 
EDUC ? -0.704 0.000 ? -0.028 0.002 ? 0.01 0.292 ? 0.014 0.124 ? 0.025 0.007 ? -0.02 0.036 
MALE - -2.149 0.002 - -0.169 0.000 - 0.204 0.000 - -0.07 0.032 - -0.008 0.812 - -0.09 0.004 
MARRY ? -2.485 0.006 ? -0.017 0.687 ? -0.1 0.025 ? -0.01 0806 ? 0.062 0.147 ? 0.008 0.841 
HEALTH + 1.602 0.000 + 0.097 0.000 + 0.088 0.000 ? 0.021 0117 ? 0.033 0.015 + 0.038 0.003 
AGE + -0.173 0.000 + 0.012 0.000 ? -0.01 0.000 ? -0.01 0.000 ? 0.006 0.000 + -0.000 0045 
      S.E.   S.E.   S.E.   S.E.   S.E. 
μ1    -1.661 -1.5 -0.1 0.091 -1.2 -1.02 -1.422 -1.23 -1.47 -1.3 
μ2    -0.875 -0.7 1.001 1.194 -1.04 -0.86 -0.244 -0.06 -0.29 -0.1 
μ3    0.205 0.38 1.775 1.975 -0.54 -0.37 1.425 1.61 0.261 0.43 
μ4    0.65 0.83 0.593 0.77 2.407 2.602 0.674 0.85 
μ5    0.995 1.18 1.678 1.866 0.925 1.1 
μ6     1.466 1.65 
R2  0.136   0.022 0.017 0.004 0.009 0.003  
No. of observations 4318   4369 4336 4374 4387 4367  
ME of EDUC -0.704 0.193   -0.037 0.012 0.007 0.007 0.017  0.011 0.017 0.006 -0.028 0.013  
Effect of EDUC  
on WTINJ 
-0.002   -0.007 0.0009 -0.0003 0.00972 0.005  
 
Note: All equations were estimated by ordered probit except for PROB, which was estimated by ordinary least squares. Sign = expected influence or sign of 
coefficient. Coeff = coefficient. μ indicates boundary values of categories for which standard errors (S.E.) are given instead of p values. The marginal effect 
(ME) of EDUC was estimated as ∑
= ∂
∂=∂
∂ J
j EDUC
jj
EDUC
EY
1
)(P , where EY stands for the expectation of the dependent variable (ILL, BOTHER, FEE, EFFECT, or 
SIDE ). Note that EDUCjP ∂∂ /)(  is usually called marginal effect (Greene, 2001). The effect of EDUC on WTINJ is calculated as the product of marginal 
effect (ME) of EDUC in this table and ME of the variable in Eq. (1), shown in Table 4. 
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Fig. 1 
Number of responses by region. 
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